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CIVIL AVIATION-LIABILITY PROBLEMS OF AIR
CARRIERS
By MRS. RoYAL B.

BINZER*

I. INTRODUCTION

In the post-war world, air transportation will wield a pro.
found influence. The science and industry of aeronautics
were comparatively new until the Second World War gave
them a phenomenal development. By the very nature of its
potentialities in peace and war, aviation raises serious questions
of public policy and numerous problems which must be solved.
One of the most important problems is that of the liability
assumed by the owner and operator of an airplane in relation
to: (1) injury inflicted on property or persons on the
ground, (2) injury to goods carried, (3) injury to passengers
carried, (4) injury sustained in a collision in mid-air, and
(5) injury sustained in collision on the ground.
This article is concerned with these questions, and both
the existing and proposed solutions to them. In order to study
and comprehend the proffered solutions, it seemed expedient
to compare them with legislation in other fields of transportation.
I.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND Op]LEGISLATION ON, AVIATION
LIABILITY

1. Foreign
Since the conclusion of World War I, several international Aviation Conventions have been arranged, but until
the Convention of Warsaw (1929), no attempt was made to
deal with questions of liability. This Convention set up the
rights and liabilities in the international carriage of passengers
and goods.
The Convention of Rome (1933)1 set up the rights and
liabilities concerning surface damage; and the Insurance
* Librarian, University of Toledo Law School. Address: 3105
Darlington Road, Toledo 6, Ohio.
'Belgium, Brazil, Gautemala, Roumania, Spain are the only
signatories.
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Protocol to the Convention in 1938 gave detailed provisions as
to the rights and liabilities of insurers and insured.Many important topics have not been touched at all, leaving it largely up to each nation to decide for itself when the
owner or operator shall be liable for injuries to person or
property caused by the aircraft. 3 This has led to much confusion and conflict between the differing national laws, 4 and
in the United States, the differing state laws have added to
the confusion.
In England, the Coronation of King George in 1911 was
the occasion for the first statute on aviation.5 Violation of the
Act, prohibiting air navigation over the procession and attendant public ceremonies, was to be punished by fine or imprisonment, unless such violation was caused by vis major.
The British Civil Aerial Transport Committee was appointed in May, 1917, and in its report of February, 1918, the
Legislative Committee of the British Civil Aerial Transport
Committee recommended a provision for absolute liability for
injuries caused by aircraft. 6 The British Air Navigation Act
of 19207 followed that recommendation, excluding liability on
the basis of trespass or nuisance only.8
The British dominions have enacted similar Acts. France,
in its Air Bill of 1913, stipulated that both the aviator and airNot ratified as yet.
'The Havana (Pan-American) Convention provided that the
law of the country over which the accident occurred should apply.
'InEngland, there is absolute liability for property damage. In
some countries there is practically no liability.
JOURNAL CROWN LAW 815, 828, 1 & 2 Geo. V, Ch. 4.
Hazeltine, Law of Civil Aerial Transport (1919) 1 JouRNAL
COmp. LEG.

(N.S.) 76.

10 & 11 Geo. V, Chapter 80.
'Section 9:
"No action shall lie in respect of trespass or in respect of nuisance by reason only of the flight of aircraft over any property
at a height which . . . is reasonable, or the ordinary incidents of

such flight ...but where material damage or loss is caused by

an aircraft in flight, taking off, or landing, or by any person in

any such aircraft, or by any article falling down from such air-

craft . . .damages shall be recoverable from the owner of the
aircraft . . . without proof of negligence or intention or other
cause of default except where the damage or loss was caused by
or contributed to by the negligence of the person by whom the

same was suffered."
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ship were made absolutely liable for damages caused on groundsmen, regardless of negligence.9
2. Domestic
In 1911, the American Bar Association Committee on Jurisprudence and Law Reform, in a report, stated:
"The navigation of the air has not become so general as to
permit uniform legislation so as to fix with legal certainty rules
for its government .

.

. but it is of the opinion that the aviator

should not be held to any greater liability than the modern

common carrier . . . and even if legislation were desirable it is

not deemed proper to say that while a common carrier by land
or water is excused from loss caused by the act of God that a
common carrier by air should be made responsible, whether
injury resulted from negligence or from inevitable accident or
vis major. Unless liability springs out of some contract or arises
out of some tort, the carrier should not be mulcted in damages,
whether the carrier be by land, sea or air."1 '
In 1911, Connecticut adopted the first measure regulating
heavier than air aviation in the United States. This Act provided as to liability that:
"Every aeronaut shall be responsible for all damages suffered in this state by any person from injuries caused by any
voyage in an airship caused by such aeronaut, and if he be the
agent or employee of another in making such voyage his principal or employer shall be responsible.
Massaehusetts, in 1913, followed the example of Connecticut and enacted an aviation law. This statute created a
presumption that damage caused by an airship was due to the
negligence of the operator. In 1919, this law was repealed and
a new one was passed in which the presumption of negligence
on the part of the aviator was abolished.
3. Uniform Aeronautics Act
After this beginning, there has been much miscellaneous
legislation by the several states, but there has not yet been developed a comprehensive set of regulations that have been generally accepted.
The most important statute in regard to domestic flying
was the Uniform Aeronautics Act," which has been adopted
'Legislative History of Air Commerce Act of 1926 (corrected
1928), p. 73 et seq., U. S. Govt. Printing Office.

"36 Am. BAR AssN. REP., 380 et seq.
The Uniform Aeronautics Act covers the subjects of definition
of terms, sovereignty of space, ownership of space, lawfulness of
flight, damage on land, collision of aircraft, jurisdiction over crimes
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by some twenty states and Hawaii.' 2 It provides, in See. 5,
that the owner of an aircraft is absolutely liable for injuries
to person or property on the ground, except where the person
injured was negligent. Section 6 provides that the liability of
the owner of one aircraft to the owner of another aircraft, or
to aeronauts or passengers on either aircraft for damage
caused by collision on land or in the air, shall be determined
by the rules of law applicable to torts on land. Except for
collision cases, no provision is made regarding liability for in3
jury to passengers or for loss or damage to goods carried.'
Wyoming, Missouri and Montana have omitted the ground
damage section. Arizona provides for a negligence standard
for damage done by forced landings. Idaho, in 1931, repealed
and reenacted the Uniform Aeronautics Act with several modifications, one of them being to change liability for damage on
land from absolute liability to that "applicable to torts on
land. ''
Pennsylvania has adopted a statute which provides that
liability shall be determined by the rules of law applicable to
4
torts on land.1
Connecticut, which was the first state to enact an aviation
statute, and which started the trend toward absolute liability
for injuries to persons or property on the ground, in its present
statute provides for a negligence standard for all injuries.':
M1aryland, in addition to the Uniform Aeronautics Act,
has a statute 16 providing that the liability of the owner of an
aircraft operating, in interstate commerce shall be limited to the
amount of his interest in the plane and its freight, 17 and Maryland has a statutory provision similar to the Harter Act, relieving owners of aircraft engaging in interstate commerce from
and torts, jurisdiction over contracts, dangerous flying, hunting from
aircraft. This Act was withdrawn from the active list of Uniform
Acts recommended for adoption at the National Conference of Comm.
on U. S. Laws, August, 1943.
"Arizona, Delaware, Georgia, Idaho, Indiana, Maryland, Michigan, Missouri, Montana. Nevada, New Jersey, North Carolina, North
Dakota, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee,
Utah, Vermont, Wisconsin, Hawaii.
" Hearings before the Committee on Interstate & Foreign Commerce, House of Rep., 68th Congress, on H. R.1012, p. 278, et seq.
"PA. STAT. ANN. (1936), Secs. 1467-73.
' CONN. GEN. STAT. (1930), Sec. 3077.
M .ANN. CODE (1935 Supp.) Art. 1A,Sec. 41.
"Similar to the Federal Marine limitation of liability.
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liability for errors in navigation, handling, etc.'$ The exemption covers both passengers and goods carried.'-"
Louisiana has a statute which requires compulsory insurance for the owner of an aircraft that carries passengers for
hire. This insurance runs in favor of "any person who may be
injured in person or property" by the operation of any air20
plane used in said business.
Virginia, at one time, had such compulsory insurance requirements for commercial aviators operating in intrastate
commerce for both personal and property damage, but has since
repealed that statute.
On the question of liability for injuries to passengers or
property carried by aircraft, it is apparent that the states have
enacted little legislation. With the exception of Mlaryland,
which applies the liberal rules of Maritime Law to interstate
flying, the few state statutes covering this question provide
that liability shall be determined by the rules of law applicable
to torts on land, or set up a negligence standard, as is used in
the law of carriers, generally.
III.

BASES OF DECISIONS ON LIABILITY OF AIRCRAFTSUMMARY.

Decisions on these questions have been based on different
theories by the various authorities: (1) The aviator is to be
likened to the operator of an automobile and proof of actual
negligence is required for recovery. (2) The aviator engaged
in carrying passengers or freight is subjected to the severe rule
usually applied to common carriers on land, and therefore
held to a high degree of care. (3) Injuries caused by aircraft
are so generally caused by some form of negligence, and proof
of actual negligence is so difficult to obtain due to the usual
destruction of the machine and the witnesses that the maxim of
res ispa loquitur should be applied, giving the presumption of
negligence to aid the plantiff. (4) the law should be so held
as to say that the principle of Rylands v. Fletcher2- 1 shall apply
to the aerial navigator and he shall be liable for any damages
"SMD. ANN. CODE (1935 Supp.) Sec. 46.
" Rittenberg, Limitations of PassengerLiability (1935) 6 JOURNAL
OF AIR LAW 365, 389, 398.
"LA. GEN. STAT. (Dart. 1939), SECS. 1-11.
21
L. R. 3 H. L. 330 (1808).
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occurring to anyone from this dangerous instrumentality
which he has caused to come into the community. 22 There have
been French and Belgian cases making the aerial navigator
an insurer of the safety of persons and property below, so far
23
as his own acts are concerned.
IV.

LIABILITY OF OTHER

FoR-Is OF

TRANSPORTATION

Because of the divergence in the bases of aviation decisions and because some of the proposed regulations may seem
to be extreme, it seemed advisable to summarize briefly the
liability laws for other forms of transportation, so that there
may be a sound basis of comparison in order to determine what
may be a fair and wise answer to these problems.
1.Railroads
As to injuries to passengers, railroads are held liable for
the highest degree of care that is practicable in view of the
circumstances, in regard to paying passengers, 24 and cannot

free itself from negligent injuries to such passengers, but the
railroad is not liable as an insurer of the passenger's safety.
Contributory negligence on the part of the passenger is a defense to the carrier.2" When fare is not paid, the railroad can
by contract exempt itself from liability for negligent injuries
to the traveler. 26
With regard to limitation of liability to passengers by contract, there is little common law authority.2 7 A number of
states have statutes forbidding common carriers to exempt
themselves from liability by contract for injuries to passengers
or property carried, resulting from their negligence; some
statutes specifically forbid limitations on the amount of liability. The doctrine of res ipsa loqztiitur has been sparingly
Zollman, Liability of Aircraft (1919) 53 Am. L. R. 879.
21

HAZELTINE, LAW OF THE AR, Ch. 2.

"'Pa. R. R. Co. v. Rogers, 244 Fed. 76 (1917); Central of Ga.
Ry. Co. v. Robertson, 203 Ala. 358, 83 So. 102 (1919); Pittsburgh Ry.

Co. v. Higgs, 165 Ind. 698, 76 N. E. 299 (1905); MacGilvrey v. Boston
El. Co., 229 Mass. 65, 118 N. E. 166 (1918).
'Winters v. B. & 0. Ry. Co., 163 Fed. 106 (1908).
2"Ulrich v. N. Y. Central Ry. Co., 108 N. Y. 80, 15 N. E. 60 (1888).

- Rittenberg, Limitations of Passenger Liability (1935)
NAL OF AIR LAW

365, 379.

6 JoUR-
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applied 28 in railroad cases of injury or death to passengers.
The railroads have a high degree of duty to protect passengers
from the negligent and wilful acts of fellow passengers and
third persons.
With regard to goods carried, the old common law rule of
liability as an insurer, except for loss caused by acts of God.
the public enemy, or fault of the shipper, or the inherent nature
of the goods has been relaxed to a certain extent.20 The Cormack Amendment to the Interstate Commerce Act 3" provided
that common carriers subject to the Interstate Commerce Act
receiving property for interstate transportation should issue a
receipt or bill of lading and become liable to the holder thereof
for any loss, damage or injury to the property caused by it
or connecting carriers; and that no other contract could exempt
the carrier from that liability as shown by the declared value.
A private carrier of goods, like other ordinary bailees, is liable
only for negligence, 3 1 and this liability can be limited by contract. 32 The common carrier is liable for loss or damage to
baggage or for freight, but is held only to a standard of ordinary care in the case of damage or loss of personal effects.3 3
In regard to crossing accidents, the railroad is under a
duty to use reasonable care. *When the person crossing is a
trespasser or mere licensee, 34 the general rule is that the only
duty of the railroad is to use due care after knowledge of the
impending danger and not to inflict wilful or wanton injury.',
Contributory negligence is a defense in crossing accidents.
There are apparently no statutes requiring railroads to carry
liability insurance of any kind.
'Vischer v. Northwestern El. Ry. Co., 256 Ill. 572, 100 N. E.
270 (1912); Breen v. N. Y. Central R. Co., 109 N. Y. 297, 16 N. E. 60
(1888); Knauth, Compulsory Aviation-Liability Insurance in Great
Britainand the United States (1937) 8 JOURNAL OF Am LAW 460, 466.
- Cleveland etc. R. Co. v. Blind, 182 Ind. 298, 105 N. E. 483
(1914).
38 Stat. 1197, 49 U. S. C. A., Sec. 20-11.
"Hanes v. Shapero, 168 N. C. 24, 84 S. E. 33 (1915).
SPilson v. Tip Top Auto, 67 Ore. 528, 136 Pac. 642 (1913).
"Ill. Central R. Co. v. Fontaine, 217 Ky. 211, 289 S. W. 263,
A. L. R. 1064 (1926).
"Sperry v. Consolidated R. Co., 79 Conn. 565, 65 Ati. 962 (1907);
Nashville C. & St. L. R. Co. v. Lillie, 112 Tenn. 331, 78 S. W. 1055

(1904).

Cunningham v. Toledo etc. Ry. Co., 260 Ill. 589, 103 N. E. 594
(1913); Chesney v. Fletchburg R. Co., 160 Mass. 211, 35 N. E. 554
(1893).
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2. Motor Vehicles
In the case of motor vehicles, the general rules of common
law liability for common carriers for injuries to passengers and
damage to property apply. Motor vehicles used in interstate
36
commerce are bound by Sec. 129 of the Motor Carrier Act,
which extends the Cormack Amendment to cover goods shipped
by motor vehicle.
The operator of a motor vehicle may use the defense of
contributory negligence in an action for personal injury3 ' or
38
for damages resulting from a collision.
Several states 3" require compulsory liability insurance or
a bond to be put up by owners or operators of motor vehicles
for hire. These statutes differ in their provisions as to amounts
of insurance to be carried and as to whether it is in favor of
passengers and goods carried or in favor of third persons or
both. Eighteen states have passed so-called financial responsibility laws. 4 ' Typical of this type of legislation is the Uniform
Automobile Liability Act.
At common law, the operator of a private motor vehicle
owes a duty of due care to guests in his automobile, but several
states have passed guest statutes which make the operator liable
to non-paying guests only in case of gross negligence.
3. Sh ips
The common carrier by water is under a duty to use the
highest standard of care toward its passengers, 4 1 but it is not
an insurer of their safety; it may use the defense of contributory negligence. 42 It is under a duty to use the utmost care to
protect passengers from the negligent and reckless acts of fellow
passengers, 4 3 but is not liable for the negligent or wilful acts
of third persons which could not have been anticipated or
44
guarded against.
49 U. S. C. A., Par. 319, 49 Stat. 563 (1935).
Gibbs v. Hardwick, 241 Mass. 546, 135 N. E. 868 (1922).
'Derks v. Towne, 183 Ia. 403, 167 N. W. 103 (1918).
'Georgia, Kansas, Massachusetts, Michigan, South Carolina,
Texas, Washington.
"Dowling, Compensation for Automobile Accidents: A Symposium (1932) 32 COL. L. R. 785.
"The Arabia, 34 F. (2d) 559 (1929); Oceanic v. Conoran, 9 F.
(2d) 734 (1925).
' Gretschmann v. Fox, 189 Fed. 716 (1911).
"Northern Comm. Co. v. Nestor, 138 Fed. 383 (1908).
"The Lusitania, 251 Fed. 715 (1918).
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The carrier, in regard to goods carried, may limit its
liability only by the stipulation of value in the bill of lading. 4
41
It is under duty to exercise due diligence in regard to safety 3
and careful navigation.
The ordinary basis of collision liability is negligence, but
where both parties are negligent, the rule is to divide the total
damages. 4 7 The liability of a ship owner for passengers' baggage is, generally speaking, the same as for merchandise or goods
4s
carried for hire.
Because of the provisions in regard to maximum liability
in the proposed aviation liability acts, a word should be added
about the wrongful death statutes. In thirty-four states and
territories, the wrongful death acts place no limitation upon
the amount of damages recoverable. In nine of these states,
there are constitutional provisions prohibiting this type of
limitation. 49 Eighteen states and territories have statutes which
limit the maximum amount recoverable for Wrongful death.5"
In the majority of these states, the limit is $10,000. Maine and
Colorado have a $5,000 limit, and Connecticut goes up to $15,000.
The Federal "Death on the High Seas by Wrongful Act"
Statute, whch provides for suit in an admiralty court, sets no
limitation on maximum recovery.
4. Sionmary

From this survey it is clear that in none of these forms of
transportation is the carrier liable as an insurer of safety to
the passengers; with regard to goods carried, the old common
law rule of liability as insurer has been relaxed only slightly.
The common carrier is liable for loss or damage to baggage, but
is held only to a standard of ordinary care in the case of perHarter Act, 46 U. S. C. A., Pars. 190-195, Sec. 1; Reid v. Fargo,
241 U. S. 544 (1916).
" Harter Act, supra, n. 45, Secs. 2 and 3; The Rosedale, 89 Fed.
324 (1898).
' 7Green, The Harter Act (1903) 16 HARv. L. REV. 157, 174, 177.
For further provisions, see 46 U. S. C. A., Par. 183 (1935, 1936).
"sThe Thessalonika, 267 Fed. 67, cert. denied 254 U. S. 49 (1920).
"'Arizona, Arkansas, Kentucky, New York, Ohio, Oklahoma,
Pennsylvania, Utah, Wyoming.
"Alaska, Colorado, Connecticut, District of Columbia, Illinois,
Indiana, Kansas, Maine, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Missouri, New
Hampshire, New Mexico, Oregon, South Dakota, Virginia, West Virginia, Wisconsir.
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sonal effects. The carriers may use the defense of contributory
negligence, and only in the ease of motor vehicles in some states
is the operator required to carry compulsory insurance.
V.

PRESENT

AIRCRAFT

LIABILITY

CASE

LAW

1. Aircraft as carriers

The first question that has to be considered in order to
determine the liability is whether the aircraft involved is a
common or a private carrier. Generally speaking, it is a question of law for the court to determine what constitutes a common carrier, 5 ' but whether or not the person charged is
52
operating his business within that capacity is a question of fact.
It has been commonly stated that:
"The real test as to whether a man is a common carrier by
land or sea or air is whether he has held out that he will, so long
as he has room, carry for hire all persons applying, or the goods

of every person who will bring goods to him to be carried ...
Whether he holds out either expressly or by a course of conduct
that he will carry for hire, so long as he has room, all persons

applying or the goods of all persons indifferently who send him
goods to be carried."'
In the United States it has been recognized since 1925 that
an air carrier may be a common carrier of passengers 54 and
sinve the Air Commerce Act of 1926, that an air carrier may
be a common carrier of goods. It is believed that there is no
English case in which an air carrier has been held to be a common carrier. In Anslon v. Imperial Airways, 55 it was said that
if a man chose to engage in carrying goods by air as a regular
business and so represented himself to the public, he very likely
would become a common carrier, but that "the defendants in
the case at bar were not a common carrier as the conditions of
carriage reserved to the carrier the right to refuse to accept
goods for carriage. '" 5 1 Thus air lines in the United States,
whivh are engaged in passenger services on regular schedules
11Smallwood v. Jeter, 42 Idaho 169, 244 Pac. 149 (1926).

"People v.Duntley, 217 Cal. 150, 17 P. (2d) 715 (1932).
"N. American Ace. Ins. Co. v.Pitts, 213 Ala. 102, 40 A. L. R.

1111-4 (1928), 45 Am.Rep. 178 (1925).
-' N. American Ace. Ins. Co. v. Pitts, supra, n. 53.
38 Com. Cas. 227 (1933).
SHAWCHOSS AND BEAUMONT, AIR LAW, p. 147 (1945).
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on definite routes are common carriers.57 A common carrier
may refuse to carry an objectionable person, for instance, an
inebriated or insane person without a caretaker, and still be a
common carrier.58
2. Air Carriers-Liabilityfor Goods Carried
Within the two groups of carriers (private or common),
carriers of passengers are distinguished from carriers of goods,
both as to the extent of liability and as to the nature of the
contract. In aviation cases, as in other fields, the carriage of
goods is a bailment, and the injury arising from the damage is
a liability arising ex contractu, so that the carrier is held to be
absolutely liable except as to such injuries caused by the negligence of the bailor, by the inherent nature of the goods, or by
an act of God, or of the public enemy.59
3. Ai h Carriers-Liabilityfor Passengers' Safety
In the United States and Canada, it is generally held
that
a common carrier by air is bound to exercise the highest degree
of care and safety consistent with the practical operation of
the plane, but that the air carrier is not an insurer of the passengers' safety. 60 In Great Britain the standard is of reasonable
care. This duty to observe the highest degree of care extends to
all employees and servants of the common carrier connected with
the flight.0 1
"Smith v. O'Donnell, 215 Cal. 714, 12 P. (2d) 933; 1932 U. S.
Av. Rep. 148 (1932); McCusker v. Curtiss Wright Flying Service, 269
Ill. App. 502, 1933 U. S. Av. Rep. 105 (1933).
" Smith v. O'Donnell, suipra, n. 57; Beall v. McLeod, 1932 U. S.
Av. Rep. 94 (1932).
" In Wilson v. Colonial Air Transport, 278 Mass. 420, 180 N. E.
202 (1931), which was an action for loss and damage to baggage and
personal effects when the plane in which plaintiff was a passenger
nose-dived into the water, the defendant was a private carrier and
the court indicated that it was to be held to an ordinary or reasonable
standard of care. This is in line with the general railroad rule regarding personal effects. In a Canadian case, Ludditt v. Ginger
Coote Airways, 1942 U. S. Av. Rep. 178 (1942), the Supreme Court of
Canada held that an air carrier had successfully excluded all liability by special conditions which the passengers had signed.
' Smith v. O'Donnell, 215 Cal. 714, 2 P. (2d) 933 (1932); McCusker v. Curtiss Wright Flying Service, 269 Ill. App. 502, 1933 U. S.
Av. Rep. 105 (1933); Law v. Transcontinental Air Trans. Co., 1932
U. S. Av. Rep. 139 (1931).
" Goodheart v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 1936 U. S. Av. Rep. 177 (1936).
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The ordinary rule regarding private carriers by air is that
reasonable or ordinary care is required. 2 However, some
courts have imposed on private carriers the duty of highest
degree of care.0 3
The eases further appear to establish these rules: (1) A
common carrier cannot by contract exempt itself from liability
to a passenger for negligence; nor can it limit its liability for
negligenee to a certain amount by a provision printed on the
tieket.14
If a pilot, without negligence on his part? is confronted
with a sudden emergency requiring an immediate decision, he
is only required to act as a reasonably prudent man would act
in such a situation, and a mere error of judgment on his part
does not amount to negligence.15
Where an accident is attributed to unforeseen events, an
inevitable or unavoidable accident, or act of God, no liability
is attached to the carrier, if the pilot has not been negligent. 66
A passenger on an airplane assumes all the usual risks of transportation,"7 but not the negligence of the carrier either in the
handling of the craft, or its construction."8
Thus, generally, as regards aircraft liability for damage
or loss of goods carried and injuries or death to passengers,
the rules of law which have been applied by the courts have,
with some variations, been those of the law of carriers generally.
4. Air Carriers-Liabilityfor Personal Effects
The question of flying over land as a trespass per se is
not discussed in this article. In the field of negligence, there
Bird v. Louer, 272 I1. App. 522 (1933); Seaman v. Curtiss Fly-

ing Service, 1931 U. S. Av. Rep. 229 (1931); Stoll v. Curtiss Flying
Service, 1931 U. S. Av. Rep. 148 (1931).
'Berg v. Seitz, 1931 U. S. Av. Rep. 111 (1931); North Am. Acc.
Ins. Co. v. Pitts, 213 Ala. 102, 104 So. 21 (1925).
"Law v. Transcontinental Air Transportation Co., 1931 U. S. Av.
Rep. 205 (1931); Curtiss-Wright Flying Service v. Glose, 66 F. (2d)
710 (1933).

' Conklin v. Curtiss Flying Service, 1930 U. S. Av. Rep. 188
(1930); Allison v. Standard Air Lines, 1930 U. S. Av. Rep. 292 (1930);
Hagymasi v. Colonial Western Airways, 1931 U. S. Av. Rep. 73

(1931); Seaman v. Curtiss Flying Service, supra, n. 62; Conklin v.

Canadian Col. Airways, Inc., 1934 U. S. Av. Rep. 21 (1933).
"Allison v. Standard Air Lines, supra, n. 65; Johnson v. Western Air Express Corp., 114 P. (2d) 688, 1941 U. S. Av. Rep. 95 (1941).

Boulineaux v. Knoxville, 20 Tenn. App. 804, 96 S. W. (2d) 575
(1935); Allison v. Standard Air Lines, supra, n. 66.
"Beall v. McLeod, 1932 U. S. Av. Rep. 94 (1932).
L. J.-4
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is a generally accepted axiom that there shall be no liability
without fault, but, nevertheless, there is a wide field of cases
adopting the theory of absolute liability. These are based on
the concept expressed in Rylands v. Fletcher," that he who
maintains a dangerous instrumentality is liable for all damages
caused by the escape of such instrumentality, without regard
to negligence or actual fault. Proponents of this theory in
aviation cases contend that persons on the ground are helpless
to avoid the injury to themselves or their property caused by
the dangerous instrumentality, and further that it is almost
impossible for the person injured to prove the cause of the
accident.
The tendency to impose the rule of absolute liability in the
new industry of aviation began with Guille v. Swan,"' with the
forced lauding of a balloonist in a private garden. The balloonist was held liable for the entire amount of damage incurred,
including that caused by a large crowd of people who rushed
into the garden, thereby damaging- plantiff's property. It was
held that, because of the dangerous instrumentality the de1
fendant had loosed, he was absolutely liable.
The modern trend, however, is to apply the general rules
concerning torts on land to aviation cases, 72 so that the owner
and operator of an aircraft is charged with the duty to exercise
reasonable care under the particular circumstances, 7" and unless the plaintiff can show some actual damage or interference
with his use of the land, there has not been even a technical
trespass.74

In Sollak v. State of New York, 75 the plaintiff was injured
while he was a passenger in an automobile temporarily parked
on a public highway, when an airplane operated by the State
of New York struck the car. The New York Court held that
when a collision occurred between an airplane and an auto"3 H. L. 330 (1868).
" 19 Johns. 381, 10 Am. Dec. 234 (N. Y., 1822).
,'Rochester Gas & Electric Corp. v. Dunlap, 199 Misc. 84, 266
N. Y. Supp. 469 (1933); see also Canney v. Rochester Agricultural
Assn., 76 N. H. 603, 7 Atl. 517, 1928 U. S. Av. Rep. 105 (1911).
I-Gruenke v. N. American Airways, Inc., 201 Wis. 565, 230 N. W.
618, 1930 U. S. Av. Rep. 126 (1930).
'Smith v. New England Aircraft Co., 290 Mass. 511, 170 N. E.
385 (1930).
"'Hinman v. Pacific Air Transport, 94 F. (2d) 755 (1936).
1929 U. S. Av. Rep. 42 (1927).
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niobile being driven on a public highway, the doctrine of
)rcs ipsa loq utji ur7 raises a presumption of negligence on the
77
part of the airplane and its operator.
7s
In Kadylak v. O'Brien, the plaintiff's minor son was
.wimming' in a pool where a plane made a forced landing. Plaintiff recovered damages for the death. The Court said the case
was of that class where the instrumentality was under the
control of the defendant, and the accident was of such a type
as does not ordinarily happen, if due care has been used, and
that the burden was on the defendant to prove himself without fault.
5. Air (Crricrs-Liabilityto Persons and Property on the
Grou1nd, Assutmption of Risk, Collisions, etc.
The doctrine of assumption of risk must be considered in
eounetion with those cases of injuries incurred on the ground
at an airport. That is, a person who voluntarily enters upon
an authorized landing area assumes certain risks from airplane
accidents.
The courts have not applied any rule of absolute liability,
the owner or operator is only held responsible for actual damage to persons and property caused by his negligence. In State
to the iox of Blklhead v. Sam, non, 79 the Maryland Court of
Appeals held that the provisions of Section 5 of the Uniform
Aeronautics Act", providing for absolute liability for ground
damage or injuries did not apply to authorized landings at an
airport. The defendant was not held to be absolutely liable
for injuries to a boy riding a bicycle across the airport, who
was hit by defendant's plane while he was landing. The
operator was under a duty to use reasonable or ordinary care. 81

Collisions;
In Grcimke v. North Amnerican Airways Co.,82 a plane
carrying' a student for instruction collided, while-landing, with
a plane at rest on the landing field. Wisconsin had adopted
Fuller discussion under res ispsa loquitur, infra.
See, also, Kirschner v. Jones & White, 1932 U. S. Av. Rep. 278
(N. J. Supp. Ct.' 1932).
1941 U. S. Av. Rep. 8 (W. D. Pa. 1941).
171 Md. 178, 189 Atl. 265, 1937 U. S. Av. Rep. 11 (1936).
"See Uniform Aeronautics Act, supra, n. 12.
"See also Prokop v. Becker, 345 Pa. 607, 29 A. (2d) 23, 1942
U. S. Av. Rep. 84 (1942).
12 201 Wis. 565, 230 N. W. 618
(1930).
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the Uniform Aeronautics Act, which provides that liability in
collision cases shall be determined by the rules of law applicable
to torts on land. It was held that the defendant was under a
duty to use ordinary care.
In Weadock, et al. v. Eagle Inde nity,8 0 in which there
was a mid-air collision of two planes operated by students, the
school operator was held liable because he had not installed a
signal system, and the knowledge that the student had taken
off and was performing a dangerous maneuver was imputed
to him. The court said that by exercise of ordinary care he
could have acquired such knowledge and should have informed
the trainee. Thus, while a student of flying assumes the ordinary risks attendant thereto, he does not assume such a risk as
this one, which his instructor, the operator of the school, should
have eliminatedIn iNew York City Airport, Inc. v. Reed,24 the collision
was between a plane taxiing down the runway and a truck
parked on the runway. This happened in broad daylight. Here
the court held that no matter how negligent the defendant
corporation was in not keeping the runway clear, the deceased
pilot was guilty of contributory negligence in failing to use
reasonable care in looking for obstructions85
Accidents from Propellor Blades
Several cases have come up where persons have been killed
or injured by whirling propellor blades. In Williainso.n v.
Curtiss-Wright Flying Service,s0 the plaintiff was a passenger,
and in Mooni v. Lewis,S7 the plaintiff was an employee with the
duty to help pilots to start their motors. In both cases, the
courts used the ordinary common law rules of negligence and
proximate cause, placing the burden on the plaintiff to establish the negligence of the defendant and leaving the determination of the issue to the jury.
Sunmary of Ground Injuries
From the above cases, it cannot be said that there is a uniform rule for ground injuries, but the eases show certain
15 So. (2d) 132 (La. App. 1943).
N. Y. S. 245, 1933 U. S. Av. Rep. 31 (1932).
Similarly, Peavey v. City of Miami, 1941 U. S. Av. Rep. 28 (Fla.
Sup. Ct. 1941) and Magic City Airways, Inc. v. same.
1931 U. S. Av. Rep. 119 (D. C. Tex. 1931) aff. 1932.
S116 N. J. L. 521, 185 AtI. 12, 1937 U. S. Av. Rep. 167 (1936).
S4259
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tendencies: (1) A plane owner or operator will be held absolutely liable for damage to property caused by an unauthorized
landing, or crash on that property. By common law, personal
injuries to the owner of the land or some one properly on it
might fall into the same category. The Uniform Aeronautics
Aet places them there. (2) At an authorized landing place,
the operator of a plane will be held to a negligence standard
only. As to injuries occurring at public places, such as on the
highway, the Sollak case applies a negligence standard; other
courts might impose absolute liability.
6. Doetriac of Res Ipsa Loquiter in Aviation Casesss
The doetrine of res ipsa loquitur has been applied in some
eases where it was improbable that an accident would have happened without the carrier's negligence. A note in the Journal
of Air Law states :,,
"If the instrumentality causing the injury is exclusively

controlled by the defendant, and if, in the exercise of due care,
accidents of a particular nature do not usually occur from

ordinary operation and use, then it is said by the courts, for the
purpose of requiring the defendant to go forward with the evi-

dence and make explanation, that a 'presumption' or 'inference'
of negligence is raised."
The requirements or conditions which must be present
before the doctrine may be invoked are usually stated as follows:!"' (1) The apparatus must be such that, in ordinary
instances, no injurious operation may be expected unless from
a careless construction or user; (2) The injury must have been
caused by the use of an instrumentality in the exclusive control
and possession of the defendant; (3) The injurious occurrence
or condition must have happened irrespective of any voluntary
aetion or contribution at the time by the party injured.
Thus, if the above conditions are proved by the plaintiff
and the defendant fails to give a reasonable explanation which
is at least equally consistent with no negligence on his part, the
plaintiff is entitled to succeed without giving any further evidence of negligenceY'
"For a comprehensive discussion see Golden, Doctrine of Res
Ipsa Loquitur in Aviation Law (1944) So. CAL. L. R. 15; (1944) 30
So. CAL. L. R. 124.

" Gates, Negligence-Common Carriers, 4 JOURNAL AIR LAW
429, 431 (1933).
MARK SHAIN, RES IPSA LOQuITUR (1945) p. 433, et seq.
SHAwVcRoss & BEAUMONT, AIR LAW, pp. 215-252 (1942).
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It has not been applied where there was an unexplained
crash where there were no survivors, 92 "the accident might have
been caused by one or more of a number of reasons over which
the owner and operator had no control" and "ordinarily recognized natural hazards of flying which have not yet been overcome" and it could not be said that the accident was one which
could not reasonably happen in the absence of negligence.
This doctrine also has not been applied in cases where a
machine crashed within a few seconds of leaving the ground
due to engine failure;94 where the machine was fitted with
dual controls9 5 and therefore not under exclusive control of the
operator; when a machine crashed making an emergency landing;96 when a machine crashed owing to engine failure ;9iT when

a passenger was a voluntary passenger on a test flight. '"
Res ipsa loquitur has been applied: when an aeroplane in
flight collided with a stationary motor car ;"" when two planes
collided in mid-air and plantiff was a passenger in one;;1110
when a machine crashed in looping-the-loop at 200-100 foot
level;1 1 and when a machine suddenly crashed from about 200
feet shortly after taking off and in attempting to return. " ' Herndon v. Gregory, 1936 U. S. Av. R. 28 (1935); Cohen v.
United Air Lines, 1937 U. S. Av. R. 119 (1937).
Ccnklin v. Canadian Colonial Airways (1934) U. S. Av. R. 21
(1934), affd. 1935 U. S. Av. R. 97 (collision with high tension wires
in fog); and Rochester Gas & El. Corp. v. Dunlap, 1933 U. S. Av. R.
511 (1932).
"'Wilson v. Colonial Air Transport, 1932 U. S. Av. R. 139 (1932);
Hagymasi v. Colonial Western Airway, Inc., 1931 U. S. Av. R. 73
(1931); Law v. Transcontinental Air Transport, 1931 U. S. Av. R. 205
(1930).
'Parker v. Granger, 1936 U. S. Av. Rep. 251 (1936); Budgett v.
Soo Sky Ways, 1936 U. S. Av. R. 174 (1936); Mich. Aero Club v.
Shelby, 1938 U. S. Av. R. 79 (1938); Towle v. Phillips, 1943 U. S.
Av. R. 9 (1942); Morrison v. Tourneau, 1943 U. S. Av. R. 22 (1943).
Curtiss-Wright Flying Service v. Glose, 1933 U. S. Av. R. 26
(1933); Herndon v. Gregory, 1935 U. S. Av. R. 38 (1934).
'Boulineaux'v. City of Knoxville, 96 S. W. (2d) 575, 1937
U. S. Av. R. 145 (1935).
'Cohn v. United Air Lines, 1937 U. S. Av. R. 144 (1936).
" Sollak v. State of N. Y., 1929 U. S. Av. R. 42 (1927); but contrast McCusker v. Curtiss-Wright, 1933 U. S. Av. R. 105 (1933).
" Smith v. O'Donnell, 12 P. (2d) 933, 1932 U. S. Av. R. 145
(1932).
" Miller v. English, 1932 U. S. Av. R. 153 (1932).
"'2 Seaman v. Curtiss Flying Service, 1931 U. S. Av. R. 229 (1931).

LIABILITY OF

AIR

CARRIERS

These eases indicate that the application of the doctrine of
ipsa loquitur in airplane accidents is still an unsettled matter, but the tendency seems to be to extend the application, as
lately the courts have rejected the contention that the novelty
of the airplane or the youth of the industry should exclude them
from the category of common carriers if they held themselves
out to serve the public for hire. 1°
The doctrine of res ipsa loqzitur has been regarded as
p culiarly applicable to common carriers, for assuming that the
accident was of the type that ordinarily would not happen
without negligence, and the common carrier has the duty of
a high degree of care, in the case of a common carrier it is more
probable that the act or omission of the negligent party may be
lawfully attributable to the defendant carrier.
The law seems well settled to the effect that res ipsa loquitur
can be invoked where the plane is a private carrier.'" 4
i',s

7. ,itummary
From this survey it can be seen: (1) A common air carrier
in the United States is under a duty to use the highest degree
of care toward its passengers. The carrier, however, is not an
insurer of the passengers' safety. The carrier cannot ordinarily
contract itself out of liability for its own negligence. The common law regarding limitation of liability to a certain amount
isunsettled. (2) The ordinary rule regarding goods and bag-age carried by a common carrier is that the carrier is liable as
an insurer, with certain exceptions, such as an act of God, or
the public enemy, or inherent nature of the goods, etc. (3) In
regard to persons and property on the ground, the modern
trend appears to be that the owner and operator of an aircraft
is charg-ed with the duty to exercise reasonable care under the
particular circumstances.
(4) The doctrine of res ipsa
luquitur is being applied to a somewhat wider extent; and (5)
All of these seemingly predominant trends are subject to
many and diverse variations depending on the law of the state
in which the case is heard.
""SHAIN, RES IPSA LoQurTuR, p. 476 (1945); Smith v. O'Donnell,
215 Cal. 714, 12 P. (2d) 933 (1932).
' Bird v. Louer, 272 Ill. App. 522, 1934 U. S. Av. Rep. 188 (1933);
Stoll v. Curtiss Flying Service, Inc., 257 N.Y.S. 1010, 1932 U. S. Av.
Rep. 163 (1932).
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VI. PROPOSED UNFORAaE AVIATION LIABILITY ACT AND PROPOSED

Am

CARRIms ACT

Because of the diversity of the state decisions, attempts
have been made from time to time to formulate a set of rules
that would be uniformly applied either by federal legislation
or by a uniform state law. So far, none have been adopted.
In July, 1938, a proposed Uniform Aviation Liability Act was
approved by the National Conference of Commissions on Uniform State laws. All of the Uniform Aeronautics Acts were
withdrawn from the active list for recommendation by the
National Conference of Commissions, August, 1943. Presentation of the Uniform Aviation Liability Act has been postponed
pending study by the Civil Aeronautics Authority. Provisions
for liability of air carriers were put into the Lea Bill (Section
58),1 15 but this section was later taken out of it and referred
to the House of Representatives Interstate and Foreign Commerce Committee, for further study. Because of the bearing
on the proposals being discussed in the Committee, in the Congress, it is pertinent to review the provisions of the Uniform
Aviation Liability Act and to compare it with the proper clause
in the Lea Bill. 1 6
This Act covers (1) liability to passengers for injury or
death;107 (2) liability'for baggage, personal effects and goods
shipped;10s (3) liability to persons on the ground for injury
or death; (4) liability for property damage on the ground;1",
(5) liability for injury and damage, and apportionment of
liability arising from collisions of two or more aircraft. This
Act applies to all aircraft flying within the boundaries of the
state, and in the case of passengers and baggage and goods
carried, it applies whenever the contract of carriage is made
in the state.
H . R. 1210, 78th Congress-now H. R. 674, 78th Congress "Air
Carrier Liability Act, 1943". Title I prescribes necessary definitions
and other general provisions; Title II deals with liability for injury
to or death of passengers; Title III covers loss or damage to property,
baggage or personal effects; Title IV deals with survival of liability
against an express agency or operator of aircraft.
"'Analysis by G. G. Tipton, Ass. Gen. Counsel Civil Aeronautics
Bureau.
' I-H. R. 1210, Sec. 58, Title II.
'"Title III and includes loss caused by unreasonable delay.
" No comparable proposal.
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Generally speaking, the owner of aircraft carrying passengers for vompensation is made absolutely and exclusively
liable for all injuries or deaths to passengers in the course of
the journey. 11" The amount of liability is determined by a
shedule fixing a definite amount of recovery for certain
specified injuries. The amount fixed in case of death is
$10,000.11
It is not entirely clear whether $10,000 is, in all cases, the
2
lar-est amount any one person can recover for all injuries."
Perhaps, if one person suffers several injuries, he could recover
more. Compulsory insurance, 113 or a bond or cash deposit by
the carrier is required. 1 4 If the required security is not carried, the limit of liability does not apply, and in addition there
is a criminal penalty.
This proposed Act applies to non-commercial flyers only
to the extent that it makes guest statutes apply to them, but it
does not require them to carry insurance covering liability to
passengers.":,
Absolute liability is imposed upon owners of aircraft flying
commercially, for loss or damage to goods, baggage or personal
effevts.""1
If the value of the personal effects or baggage is
not declared, the recovery is limited to $100, otherwise there can
be no recovery for the actual loss, limited only by the declared
value. As to goods,1 7 there can always be a recovery in the
amount of actual loss, except that when the value has been
Title II provides the operator is liable unless he proves affirmatively that the injury or death did not arise from wilful misconduct
or failure to use the highest degree of care. Title III-operator can
escape liability if he proves contributory negligence or wilful misconduct of the passenger.
Title II agrees.
"
"
Title II "may not exceed $10,000."
Compare with English rule.
." Part III of Air Navigation Act, 1936; SHAWCROSS & BEAUMONT,
Ai LAW, p. 271, et seq. (1945).
"' Similar provision in Air Carriers Liability Act.
" Title III-liability is imposed unless operator proves affirmatively that the loss or delay did not proximately result from wilful
misconduct or failure to use the highest degree of care. He may
also escape liability by proving that the loss, damage or delay was
not caused by an error of piloting, in the handling of aircraft, or in
navigation, or that it was caused by the negligence or wilful misconduct of the person who suffered the loss or his servants.
"'Title III-Liability for goods, etc., is limited to the amount of
actual loss, may not exceed $50 or 50c per lb. if over 100 lbs., unless
value is declared before shipment.
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declared, the recovery cannot exceed the amount declarect.
Again, in this provision the proposed Act does not apply to
non-commercial flights.
Absolute liability is imposed on the owners of all aircraft
for injuries or death to persons on the ground and for damage
to property on the ground. 118 Liability is limited to actual
damage with a maximum of $10,000 for the death or injury of
one person, and there is a maximum liability per accident for
personal injuries or death based on the horsepower of the
plane." 9 Liability for property damage is limited to $5.00 for
each pound of weight of the craft. Compulsory insurance
against both property damage and personal injuries or death
is required. If insurance is not carried, the liability imposed
is unlimited, and there is a criminal penalty.

Contrary to the

provisions regarding passengers, the plaintiff has an option to
sue the owner for negligence. In such a suit, the amount of
recovery is unlimited. No insurance against this possibly
greater liability is required.
In regard to collisions, owners of aircraft are made liable
to the owners, passengers and employees of other aircraft upon
the basis of negligence, where a collision caused by the negligence of two or more aircraft is determined upon a comparative
negligence basis. The owner of an aircraft in a collision is
absolutely liable for injuries to his own passengers and goods
carried, and for injuries to persons or property on the land.
However, he has a right against the other owners of aircraft in
the collision for negligence. 120
VII. COMPARISON

OF

PRESENT

DECISIONS

UNriFORm AvIATION LniIAITY ACT-AI

AND

THE

PROPOSED

CARRIERS' LIABILITY ACT

From the recent decisions, it can be seen that: (1)

A com-

mon carrier is under a duty to use the highest degree of care
toward its passengers. The carrier, however, is not an insurer
of the passengers' safety. This applies to railroads, motor
carriers, ships and aircraft. The carrier cannot ordinarily
contract itself out of liability for its own negligence. The
" Nothing comparable in "Air Carriers Liability Act."
" $20,000 for a plane of 200 h. p. or less, to $100,000 for a plane
of over 900 h. p.
" This analysis was prepared for the information of a Committee
of the Air Transport Ass'n. of America.
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law regarding limitation of liability to a certain
amount is unsettled.
t'onmmlon

The proposed Uniform Act imposes on aircraft carrying
passengers an almost absolute liability, a higher liability than
on any other type of carrier, albeit there is a limitation of
maximum liability. The proposed Air Carrier Act is somewhat more in line with the present decisions. The operator
must prove affirmatively that he was not guilty of misconduct
or failure to use the highest degree of care, and he can use the
defense of contributory negligence. This Act, too, sets a maximum monetary liability.
(2) The ordinary rule regarding goods and baggage and
personal effects carried by a common carrier is that the
carrier is liable as an insurer, with certain exceptions, such as
an act of God, or the public enemy, or the inherent nature of
the goods, etc. Ship owners can limit the amount of their
liability by contract, and in some jurisdictions railroads
CaL, too.
The proposed Uniform Act imposes absolute liability without any exceptions; although liability can be limited to a
declared value, the privilege is substantially the same as that
1,joyed by other types of carriers. This is, again, a higher
standard of care than any other form of transportation is subjected to in this country. In the proposed "Air Carrier Act," the
sction regarding goods, baggage and personal effects carries
the same liability as for injury to persons; the operator is liable
unless he proves affirmatively that he is without fault, or that
the person who suffered the loss was guilty of wilful misconduct or negligence.
(3) The common-law rule as to guests in automobiles is
that the operator is under a duty to use reasonable or ordinary
care. Some state statutes lower this standard to one of gross
neoligence.
The proposed Uniform Act would make these
statutes apply to aircraft, thus lowering the present standard
of liability. There is no section on this in the "Air Carriers
Act."
(4) Railroads are under a duty to use ordinary or reasonable care regarding persons properly on the tracks; they are
under a duty to use due care toward a trespasser only if his
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presence is known. Motorists are under a duty to use ordinary
care with regard to persons on the street.
The proposed Uniform Act makes aircraft operators absolutely liable on the theory of the helplessness of the landowner to prevent planes from crashing on his land. As has been
shown, several states have taken this view; the same result has
been reached at common law on the theory of trespass. The
Rome Convention' 2 ' and the Air Navigation Act of 1936 in
Great Britain also provide for absolute, limited liability.
(5) As to collisions, under the proposed Uniform Act, the
standard as between operators of planes involved in the accident is one of negligence, just as it is at common law. Where
two or more operators are negligent, the liability is distributed
on a comparative negligence basis. This is closely allied to
admiralty law, and differs from the present common-law rule
that contributory negligence is a defense. The "Air Carriers
Act" has no provision on this point.
(6) Both of the proposed Acts provide that all aircraft
must carry compulsory insurance against liability for ground
injuries and damage; aircraft carrying passengers for hire
must insure against liability for injury to them. In the ease
1 22
Some
of railroads, there is no such compulsory insurance.
states have such statutes for motor vehicles. Louisiana, alone,
has such a statute for operators of aircraft. The Rome Convention and the Air Navigation Act of 1936 of Great Britain
have such provisions, but neither Act has as yet gone into effect.
VIII. CoNcLusIoN

It is necessary to decide two main questions: First, is it
necessary to have uniform legislation on questions of liability'?
Second, assuming that uniformity is necessary, which method,
by Uniform State Acts, or by Federal Act, would be the more
effective and desirable? Then come the questions as to the
substance of the liability provisions.
First, from the viewpoint of the passenger or the man on
the ground, uniformity in aviation liability is not a matter of
great importance. Uniformity in this matter is much less vital
See n. 1, supra.
I The present Lea Bill, as amended, provides for an investigation
by the Civil Aeronautics Commission as to matters affecting aviation
insurance and reinsurance.
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to him than, for example, in the law of sales. From the point
of view of the air carrier and the insurance company, however,
uniformity would be highly desirable; and as to shipments,
it is very important.
With the cessation of hostilities will come a tremendous
increase in air traffic, commercial and private. M1ore and more
goods will be shipped by air, there will be thousands of air
passengers where comparatively few people flew before. With
the increase in air miles travelled, and the people and goods being
transported and shipped by air, there will come into courts
more cases involving questions of liability, and uniformity in
law will be essential in this field as well as in the other fields
of aviation law. The speed and distance of travel in air transcends state lines.
Second, the chief effect of a uniform statute is to make
possible the handling of claims with a minimum of litigation.
If an act covering the provisions set out in the proposed Uniform Act is passed, there will undoubtedly be a flood of litigation. Several of the proposals present serious constitutional
questions; for instance, the compulsory insurance and absolute
liability clauses. These questions might very well have to be
tested in each state court, and the federal courts, as well, to
establish whether or not such provisions are an unconstitutional
burden on interstate commerce. It must be kept in mind that
rarely will the contract of carriage, the injury or loss, and the
bringing of suit all take place in the same state.
Another possibility to be kept in mind is the length of
time that may elapse before all, or substantially all, of the
states would pass a Uniform Aviation Liability Act. The Uniforim State Aeronautics Act was adopted by the National Conference of Commissioners in 1922, and has never been adopted
by even half the states. Also, this should be considered-even
if all the states should adopt the Uniform Act, will the courts
of all the states interpret the provisions uniformly?
Because of these difficulties, the answer seems to lie in
federal legislation, at least with respect to passengers and goods
carried on the aircraft. A federal statute applying to interstate operations would cover substantially all airline accidents.
Third, as to the provisions of such an Act:
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(1) The proposal of absolute liability as to injuries or death
of passengers, as has been shown, would be a heavier burden
than any other form of transportation bears. The proposal in
the Federal Act seems to be more just. It amounts practicalli
to a form of statutory res ipsa loquitur; that the defendant
must prove his.non-negligen~e. This principle is incorporated
in the Warsaw Convention,' 2 3 which was signed by the United
States.
(2) There might also be an exemption of liability for piloting and navigation errors similar to the exemption in the Harter
Act, which applies to carriage of goods by sea, and which is also
written into the Warsaw Convention with respect to goods and
2 4
baggage. In neither does the exemption apply to passengers.'
(3) As to ground injuries and damage, the time may not
yet be ripe to attempt final and permanent codifications. It
has been shown that the early decisions were based on absolute
liability, and that the modern trend generally seems to relax
that harsh rule. It is true that the Rome Convention proposes
absolute liability again, but it must also be borne in mind that
that Convention has never obtained enough signatories for it
to go into effect.
(4) As to compulsory insurance, the Lea Bill, in its
amended form, provides for an investigation into that question
by the Civil Aeronautics Commission. That Commission will
undoubtedly bring in recommendations which will be acted
upon. This problem is very controversial and too involved to
be discussed fully here.
Aviation has now reached the point in development where
uniform standards of liability are essential. The best interests of both the carriers and their patrons demand that those
standards should be set by Federal enactment. The standards
in the beginning, at least, may not cover all possible situations.
Aviation is still a growing industry, a most complex one, and
the body of laws governing it must grow with it.

SHAwcRoss

AND

BEAUMONT,

AIR LAW,

pp.

25, 47, 278, 682

(1945).

"' In the Maryland Statute, the exemption applies to both goods
and passengers.
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